This study aims to generate thorough and comprehensive review of the teacher’s perspective and hands-on experience in mainstreaming LSENs in a regular classroom, including teachers’ attitudes and perceptions, challenges encountered, and teaching approach in handling mainstreamed classrooms. A scoping review framework by Arksey and O’Malley’s (2005) systematically analyzed the data of the different articles conducted by various scholars. Through scrupulous and through selection of related studies, 10 articles were included in the review from 6 different countries across the globe. The (...) articles included were conducted from 6 countries and various databases. The study highlighted that: 1) teachers have positive and negative attitudes towards mainstreaming, 2) teachers experienced various challenges in handling a mainstream classroom, and 3) learner-centered approach to learning is used in the classroom. Mainstreaming LSENs in a regular classroom has pros and cons among teachers, regular students, and the LSENs themselves. Hence, a daunting responsibility for the teachers. Nevertheless, it is imperative to support teachers by giving seminars and training, especially to those non-special education majors, to be fully equipped to handle mainstreamed classrooms. (shrink)

The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are (...) discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising may be relevant, but will not be decisive, in answering this question. (shrink)

XENOLOGY AND XENOTOPOGRAPHY OF BERNHARD WALDENFELS The paper strives to adapt Bernhard Waldenfels’ xenology and so called ‘xenotopography’ for the philosophico-literary studies in fantastic world-building with a special concern of the ‘portal-quest’ model of fantasy and SF. Following Waldenfel’s remarks on the nature of post- Husserlian diastasis of our world [Heimwelt] and otherworld [Fremdwelt] and acknowledging the consequences of allocating one’s attitude towards the otherness in the symbolical borderland [‘sphere of intermonde’] in between, it is examined whether such a model (...) can occur in the fantastic literature and what may be the consequence of xenotopographic reconsideration of its basic ontological premises. Additionally, the article offers an original xenotopograpfic model of worldbuilding which addresses three carefully chosen case studies of fantastic worlds from Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game tetralogy, Neil Gaiman’s Stardust and George R. R. Martin’s The Song of Ice and Fire. In the end, it is suggested that hitherto presented xenotopography gravely inspired a postmodern shift in the genres of fantasy and SF which results in more ethically conscious representations of the otherness and even more concise and alien comprehensive world-building. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. BIBLIOGRAPHY Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., & Kim, J. (eds.) (1992). Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of Naturalism. New York: Routledge. Bhaskar, R., Danermark, B. & Price, L. (2018). Interdisciplinarity and wellbeing: A critical realist general theory of interdisciplinarity. London and New York: Routledge. Blau, P.M. (1981). Introduction: diverse views of social structure and their common denominator. In Blau, P.M. & Merton, R.K. (eds.), Continuity in Structural Inquiry (pp. 1–23). Beverly Hills: Sage. Blau, P.M. (1987). Microprocess and macrostructure. In K.S. Cook (ed.), Social Exchange Theory (pp. 83–100). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Brooks, R.A., & Maes, P. (eds). (1994). Artificial life IV; proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Coleman, J. S. (1987). Microfoundations and macrosocial behavior. In: J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, R. Munch, & Neil J. Smelser (Eds.). The Micro-Macro Link (pp. 153–73). Berkeley: University of California. Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Elster, J. (1985). Making sense of Marx. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, J.A. (1974). Special sciences (Or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 28(2), 97–115. Fodor, J.A. (1989). Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics, 17, 59-79. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hempel, C.G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press. Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world. Mind, 102, 555-586. Humphreys, P. (1997). How properties emerge”. Philosophy of Science, 64, 1-17. Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3–36. Kincaid, H. (1997). Individualism and the unity of science. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Lewis, D.K. (1986). The plurality of worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nigel, G., & Conte, R. (eds.) (1995). Artificial societies; The computer simulation of social life. London: UCL Press. O’Connor, T. (1994). Emergent properties. American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 91-104. Popper, K.R. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. Sawyer, R. K. (2001). Emergence in sociology: contemporary philosophy of mind and some implications for sociological theory. American Journal of Sociology, 107, 551-585. Sawyer, R. K. (2004). The mechanisms of emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34, 260–282. Sawyer, R. K. (2005). Social emergence: societies as complex systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sawyer, R.K. (2003). Nonreductive individualism: Part 2, Social causation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, 203–224. Winch, P. (1993). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy‭ (SAMT, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: SAMT. (shrink)

In this eleventh book of scilogs – called in-turns and out-turns –, one may find new and old questions and solutions, referring mostly to topics on Neutrosophy, but also Multispace, with miscellaneous addition of topics on Physics, Mathematics, or Sociology – email messages to research colleagues, or replies, notes about authors, articles, or books, spontaneous ideas, and so on. -/- Exchanging ideas with Prem Kumar Singh, Feng Liu, Nicolae Bălașa, Jimmy Quellet, Minodora Rușchița, Frank Gelli, A. R. Vătuiu, Victor Christianto, (...) Vladimir I. Rogozhin, Robert Neil Boyd, Akira Kanda, Stefan Spaarmann, Oliver Consa, Yabin Shao, Junle Zhuo, Nivetha Martin, Said Broumi, Jean Dezert, Erick González, Tomasz Witczak, B. De Baets, I. Couso, D. Dubois, L. Good, Mihaela Colhon, Atiqe Ur Rahman, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Ihsan, Edeline Nancy, Shawkat Alkhazaleh, Shazia Rana, Vasantha Kandasamy, Santanu Acharjee, Mohamed Al-Shmrani, Parimala Manie, Mehmet Unver, Murat Olgun, Adel Aleidhri, Akira Kanda, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, Mircea Zărnescu, R. Tayebi Khorami, Arsham Borumand Saeid, Maisam Jdid, M. Abobala, Riad Hamido, Rafael Rojas, Esmaeil Zarei, Faisal Khan, Rouzbeh Abbassi, Adel Al-Odhari, Henry Garrett, Ackbar Rezaei, Saeid Jafari, Karthika Muthusamy, Harish Garg, Huda E. Khalid, Gonca D. Güngör, Muslim A. Noah Zainal, Fakhry Asad Agusfrianto, Madeleine Al-Tahan, Mariam Hariri, Yudi Mahatma, Masoud Ghods, Marco Brigliadori, Luis Enrique Aponte Pérez, Amr Mohammed, M. Aslam (in order of reference in the book). (shrink)

DESENVOLVIMENTO EMBRIONÁRIO E DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL -/- E. I. C. da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE sede -/- 1.1 INTRODUÇÃO O sexo foi definido como a soma das diferenças morfológicas, fisiológicas e psicológicas que distinguem o macho da fêmea permitindo a reprodução sexual e assegurando a continuidade das espécies. Os processos de diferenciação sexual são realizados durante o desenvolvimento embrionário, onde ocorre a proliferação, diferenciação e maturação das células germinativas e primordiais, precursoras (...) de ovócitos e espermatozoides em fêmeas e machos, respectivamente. Assim, os embriões machos e fêmeas iniciam o seu desenvolvimento de forma semelhante, de modo que em ambos os sexos se estabelecem em estruturas idênticas a partir das quais se formarão os órgãos reprodutores correspondentes a cada sexo. O conhecimento da origem e do desenvolvimento do aparelho genital é indispensável para entender sua função e as alterações que produzem infertilidade ou esterilidade. 1.2 DETERMINAÇÃO DO SEXO CROMOSSÔMICO Nos mamíferos, o sexo cromossômico é determinado no momento da fertilização, quando um óvulo, que contém um cromossomo X, é fecundado por um espermatozoide portador de um cromossomo X ou um cromossomo Y. No primeiro caso, o complemento cromossômico seria XX, o que originaria uma fêmea (sexo homogamético), e no segundo daria como resultado um macho com a fórmula cromossômica XY (sexo heterogâmico). 1.3 A GÔNADA INDIFERENCIADA A primeira manifestação das gônadas se aprecia no embrião em forma de um par de eminências longitudinais chamadas cristas ou dobras gonodais, situadas em ambos os lados da linha média entre os mesonefros (rins em desenvolvimento) e do mesentério dorsal. Nos embriões dos mamíferos, as células germinativas primordiais (CGP) manifestam-se em estágios precoces do desenvolvimento, podendo ser detectadas pela primeira vez na metade da gastrulação. As CGP são células grandes, de citoplasma claro e núcleo grande e redondo, localizadas na parede do saco vitelino, perto do alantoide. Essas células possuem grande capacidade de proliferação e vão migrar desde o endoderma do intestino e o epitélio do saco vitelino, através do mesentério, até as cristas gonodais. Isso ocorre por volta do 26° dia da gestação no bovino. Sua migração realiza-se graças aos movimentos de translocação passiva e deslocamento ameboide ativo. Desconhece-se o mecanismo pelo qual estas células são dirigidas para as cristas gonodais, porém foram estudadas algumas moléculas que se expressam durante sua migração e que poderiam desempenhar um papel importante na diferenciação deste tipo celular. A fosfatase alcalina é uma enzima que tem sido usada como marcador de CGP para determinar a sua origem e migração. Num estudo recente, foi inserido um marcador fluorescente que se exprime unicamente nas células germinativas primordiais de embriões transgênicos, e utilizando este marcador e a fosfatase alcalina determinou-se a origem e o padrão de migração destas células. O primeiro sinal de diferenciação das células germinativas primordiais é a expressão de fosfatase alcalina, e esta apareceu pela primeira vez na parte mais posterior da linha primitiva. No sétimo dia de desenvolvimento no embrião do camundongo, o endoderma visceral (AF+) é substituído pelo endoderma definitivo (AF-) originado na parte anterior da linha primitiva. O fator de transcrição Oct-4 é expresso nas CGP de ambos os sexos, pelo que acredita-se estar envolvido na mantença a totipotêncialidade das células. O receptor tirosina quinase, cujo ligante é o fator de Steel, é outra das moléculas que expressam as CGP. Tem sido demonstrado que este receptor possui um papel muito importante na sobrevivência deste tipo celular. Existem outros fatores que promovem a sobrevivência e/ou proliferação de CGP in vitro. Em experiências realizadas com o fator de transformação beta I (TGFβ-I), observou-se que este tem um efeito negativo sobre a proliferação das CGP. Outra atividade que tem sido postulada a este fator é o de um agente quimioatraente que possivelmente possa direcionar a migração destas células para a gônada. a) Um formado pelas células germinativas primordiais (precursoras dos gametas masculinos ou femininos), rodeadas de células somáticas das quais posteriormente se derivarão as células de Sertoli no macho e as células da granulosa na fêmea. b) O tecido que formará o estroma da gônada: tecido conjuntivo, vasos sanguíneos e as células intersticiais com atividade esteroidogênica (células de Leydig no testículo e a teca interna do ovário). As células somáticas do primórdio gonodal originam-se do mesoderma. Inicialmente são de três tipos: mesenquimáticas, mesoteliais e endoteliais. As células mesenquimáticas e mesoteliais iniciam grande atividade proliferativa ao chegar as CGP. Observa-se então uma condensação de células de origem mesotelial e mesenquimatoso que forma um agregado compacto denominado "blastema gonodal". A partir deste primórdio embrionário, diferenciam-se dois tecidos gonodais: os cordões sexuais e o estroma. Os cordões sexuais são arranjos epiteliais que se encontram delimitados por uma folha basal, e dentro deles encontramos as CGP. Por sua vez, no estroma encontram-se células do tipo mesenquimático e vasos sanguíneos. Neste momento, as gônadas são indiferenciadas e bipotencialmente sexuais, sendo impossível diferenciar, morfologicamente, uma gônada masculina de uma feminina, mas no caso dos machos genéticos já existe uma diferenciação da gônada a nível molecular. Nesta fase já se encontram presentes as estruturas das quais se desenvolvem os dutos mesonéfricos ou de Wolff precursores do aparelho genital masculino e os dutos paramesonéfricos ou de Müller que darão origem ao aparelho reprodutor feminino. Há uma série de fatores envolvidos no desenvolvimento precoce da gônada, entre os quais o fator esteroidogênico I (SFI: Steroidogenic fator l), que é um membro da subfamília de receptores nucleares, receptores órfãos. Este fator de transcrição tem um local de ligação ao DNA composto por dois dedos-de-Zinc. O SFI foi identificado como um ativador de genes envolvidos na biossíntese de esteroides em diferentes células. O SFI está presente durante o desenvolvimento embrionário em regiões associadas com funções endócrinas como gônadas, adrenais, pituitárias e hipotálamos. Os animais homozigotos para o gene SFI defeituoso, necessitam de gônadas e adrenais e têm a função gonadotrófica alterada. Os ratos sem SFI carecem de gonadotrofos e têm um desenvolvimento anormal do núcleo ventro-medial do hipotálamo; em particular as gônadas deixam de se desenvolver entre os dias 11 a 15 e degeneram-se por apoptose. No entanto, a crista genital forma-se e é colonizada pelas células germinativas, o que indica que estas continuam a receber o sinal adequado para a sua migração. Portanto, o SFI não está envolvido no desenvolvimento precoce da gônada e do sistema urogenital, mas parece estar envolvido na manutenção do crescimento das células somáticas presentes na gônada indiferenciada. O gene associado ao tumor de Wilms (WTI: Wilm's tumor Associated) está envolvido no desenvolvimento da gônada e do rim. Durante o desenvolvimento embrionário, WTI se expressa em todo o mesoderma intermediário e posteriormente na gônada indiferenciada, bem como no rim em formação. WTI regula o sinal indutivo do mesênquima para o epitélio celômico dos mesonefros. Se este for o caso, então WTI é responsável pelo crescimento da crista genital ao dirigir a entrada do epitélio celômico. Dado que estas células darão origem às células de Sertoli, a carência de WTI pode causar o desenvolvimento de embriões XY como fêmeas simplesmente porque não se formam as células de Sertoli. Em geral, todos os genes importantes na diferenciação do mesoderma intermediário e do sistema urogenital intervêm no desenvolvimento da gônada precoce. 1.4 DIFERENCIAÇÃO GONODAL O desenvolvimento das gônadas e ductos genitais descritos até o momento, é o mesmo para ambos os sexos. Igualmente, os genes descritos, que estão envolvidos no desenvolvimento das gônadas, ductos genitais e migração das células germinativas, afetam igualmente os embriões com genótipo XX ou XY. A gônada primitiva consiste anatomicamente de uma medula (interna) e uma crosta (externa), e de acordo com o local onde ocorre a colonização das células germinativas, diferenciara em testículo ou um ovário, respectivamente. Nos mamíferos, a primeira manifestação estrutural de diferenciação sexual é detectada na gônada dos machos, onde as células germinativas estão localizadas na medula. A diferenciação do testículo inicia-se quando os cordões sexuais se separam do epitélio celômico como consequência dos arranjos produzidos por uma invasão do mesênquima e vasos sanguíneos que provoca a compactação dos cordões, agora denominados cordões testiculares. As células que rodeiam os cordões se achatam e formam as células mioides, que são responsáveis pela formação das membranas basais. As células do epitélio interno, ou seja, as células de Sertoli, têm duas funções principais: o suporte das CGP e a síntese da hormona antimulleriana, responsável pela regressão dos ductos de Müller e secretada durante o período de diferenciação sexual. As células do estroma que rodeiam os cordões testiculares diferenciam-se para formar vários tipos de células: células mioides, fibroblastos, endotélio e células de Leydig, que são as mais importantes pela sua atividade endócrina. Posteriormente, os cordões testiculares dão origem aos túbulos seminíferos, que contêm o epitélio que produzirá os espermatozoides ao chegar à puberdade. Na fêmea, durante os estágios iniciais de diferenciação gonodal, não se observam mudanças em relação à gônada indiferenciada, só pode-se observar um certo crescimento devido à proliferação de células somáticas e germinativas. As células germinativas iniciam um período de proliferação, que termina com o início da meiose. Iniciada a meiose, dá-se o processo de foliculogênese; neste momento os cordões epiteliais se fragmentam, de tal maneira que cada ovócito fica rodeado de células epiteliais cobertas por uma folha basal fina (figura 1). Para que a gônada primitiva se desenvolva em testículo é indispensável a presença do cromossoma Y, independentemente do número de cromossomas X que contenha o genoma de um indivíduo. O gene determinante do testículo encontra-se localizado no cromossoma Y, denominado sry em ratos e SRY em humanos. O gene sry se expressa durante o desenvolvimento embrionário na crista genital de embriões de camundongos. A expressão é detectável no dia 10,5, pouco depois do aparecimento das cristas genitais, atinge o seu máximo durante o dia 11,5 e mantém-se até pouco depois de ocorrerem os primeiros sinais morfológicos de diferenciação testicular no dia 12,5. Este padrão de expressão é compatível com a teoria de que sry atua induzindo a ativação dos genes (figura 2) que conduzem ao desenvolvimento testicular, sem que exista a necessidade da expressão contínua de sry para manter a diferenciação do testículo após o dia 12,5. Como mencionado anteriormente, a gônada primitiva é composta por vários tipos de células. No entanto, as células germinativas primordiais não são o local de expressão do sry, já que os embriões que necessitam de células germinativas mantêm a expressão de sry e desenvolvem o sexo gonodal normalmente. As células somáticas na gônada em desenvolvimento incluem também as células de suporte. Sabe-se que é nestas células que o sry é expresso para que se diferenciem em células de Sertoli, e a expressão transitória de sry indica que deve ativar a outros genes para a manutenção das células de Sertoli. Uma vez diferenciadas as células de Sertoli, elas se encarregarão da diferenciação do resto das células na gônada. -/- Figura 1: Representação da diferenciação dos órgãos genitais internos. Adaptado de BRONSON, 1989. Figura 2: Cascada de genes envolvidos na diferenciação sexual, adaptado de KOOPMAN, 1999. O fator sry é necessário para a diferenciação do testículo. Embora não se conheçam os genes que provavelmente regulam esse gene, estudos realizados em camundongos demonstram que este gene parece coordenar-se com certos genes autossômicos. Entre estes genes autossômicos, o sox9, que é produzido pelas células de Sertoli uma vez que são estimuladas por sry, de modo que sox9 é um dos genes relacionados estruturalmente com sry. O Sox9 funciona como um fator de transcrição, mas não se sabe se a proteína tem qualquer outra função estrutural; este gene exprime-se abundantemente nos condrócitos e está relacionado com defeitos do aparelho ósseo chamados displasia campomélica. Curiosamente, os pacientes XY com esta condição sofrem frequentemente de reversão do sexo. O Sox9 é um dos poucos genes, além do SRY, do qual as mutações demonstraram interferir com a determinação sexual masculina. No entanto, apenas 75% dos pacientes com anomalias esqueléticas de tipo displasia campomélica têm reversão sexual e não foram encontrados casos de reversão sexual devido a um defeito de Sox9 que não seja acompanhado de defeitos esqueléticos. Isso indica que o Sox9 é apenas um membro da rede de genes que são ativados para determinar a diferenciação sexual, enquanto a rota que rege a condrogênese é mais sensível a perturbações deste. O momento em que se detecta a expressão do gene Sox9 (11dpc em ratos) coincide com a máxima expressão de sry, o que poderia indicar a possibilidade de que sry regule positivamente a Sox9. De fato, na região do promotor de Sox9 há um local de união ao que potencialmente se pode unir o sry. A expressão de Sox9 durante a diferenciação sexual sugere um papel abaixo de sry na diferenciação das células de Sertoli. O cromossoma X também é importante na diferenciação gonodal. O gene DAX-I foi isolado do lócus DSS (Dosage sensitive sex reversal) do cromossoma X. DAX-I é parte da cascata de determinação sexual, mas não é necessário para a formação do testículo. DAX-I é um membro dos receptores nucleares conhecidos como receptores órfãos. Este gene demonstrou ser um poderoso repressor da transcrição de SFI e de vários genes. Os padrões de expressão de DAX-I são complementares daqueles de SFI, ambos expressos nas cristas genitais. Em resumo, dada a evidência exposta, desenvolveu-se a hipótese de que DAX-I é um antagonista de sry; esse antagonismo é dependente dos níveis relativos de DAX-I e sry e de um limiar que varia de espécie para espécie. A DAX-I foi classificada como o gene antitestículo. Na fêmea (cariótipo XX) é importante que ocorra a inativação de um dos cromossomas sexuais X para que se mantenha o equilíbrio genético ao igualar o conteúdo de DNA dos cromossomas. Esse cromossoma inativado constitui o chamado corpúsculo de Barr. No entanto, para que a meiose se realize, é necessário dos dois cromossomas X ativos nos ovócitos para assegurar a diferenciação ovárica e a fertilidade. 1.5 DIFERENCIAÇÃO DOS DUCTOS SEXUAIS O embrião possui, além das gônadas indiferenciadas, dois sistemas de ductos: os de potencialidade masculina denominam-se ductos de Wolff ou mesonéfricos, e os de potencialidade feminina se chamam ductos de Müller ou paramesonéfricos (figura 1). Se a diferenciação gonodal levou à formação de um testículo, a partir do ducto mesonéfrico ou de Wolff se desenvolverão os ductos eferentes, o epidídimo, os ductos deferentes e as vesículas seminais. As hormonas importantes no desenvolvimento do aparelho genital masculino são a testosterona, produzida pelas células de Leydig, e sua forma 5α reduzida, a 5α di-hidrotestosterona. Acredita-se que a testosterona é responsável pela virilização dos ductos de Wolff, e a di-hidrotestosterona dos órgãos genitais externos. No macho, os canais de Müller atrofiam-se devido à ação de uma hormona fetal de origem testicular denominada hormona inibidora das estruturas de Müller (HIM) ou hormona antimulleriana. Este processo começa assim que os cordões espermáticos se formam e se diferenciam as células de Sertoli. A existência de HIM foi proposta baseada em estudos realizados em bezerras freemartin, devido à existência de uma hormona responsável pela atresia dos ductos de Müller que na fêmea dá origem ao útero e aos ovidutos. Essa hormona provoca a involução do aparelho genital do bovino nas gestações gemelares nas quais os produtos de diferente sexo têm comunicação sanguínea por ter ocorrido a anastomose dos vasos de ambas as placentas (figura 3). A HIM é uma glicoproteína pertencente à subfamília de TGFβ, é expressa pelas células que darão origem às células de Sertoli e é um dos primeiros marcadores de diferenciação nestas células. A HIM é secretada na vida adulta pelas células de Sertoli no testículo e por células da granulosa no ovário. No rato a HIM é expressa-se no 12° dia em um teste padrão que segue muito de perto o aumento na expressão de sry. No macho, esta secreção de HIM continua durante a vida fetal e adulta, contudo os níveis de HIM declinam na puberdade devido a um aumento na secreção de testosterona. Vários fatores intervêm na regulação do gene de HIM, incluindo os acima descritos SFI e Sox9. O gene HIM contém segmentos de DNA que são conservados em várias espécies de vertebrados. Existe um nexo de ligação para SFI, que ativa a transcrição de HIM. A mutação no local de ligação de SFI resulta em reversão do sexo em indivíduos XY incluindo genitais femininos normais, presença de um útero formado enfatizando a importância de SFI na determinação sexual e na expressão de HIM. Embora SFI seja um bom candidato como regulador de HIM, é expresso em outras células, como as de Leydig e adrenais, que não expressam HIM. Em contrapartida, Sox9 é expresso unicamente nas células de Sertoli que são as produtoras de HIM. O gene HIM também tem um nexo de ligação para Sox9. Além disso, Sox9 pode atuar sinergicamente com SFI para promover a secreção de HIM. Ao contrário destes dois fatores de transcrição, DAX-I antagoniza a ação de Sox9 e provavelmente SFI sobre o promotor de HIM. Assim, para que as células de Sertoli secretem HIM, a transcrição de DAX-I deve diminuir. Figura 3: Representação da diferenciação dos órgãos genitais externos. Adaptado de BRONSON, 1989. Os ductos de Wolff tornam-se o sistema de ejaculação do macho. A porção mais próxima dos testículos dá origem ao epidídimo, a parte central ao ducto deferente e a porção mais distal às vesículas seminais. A próstata e a parte membranosa da uretra do macho desenvolvem-se a partir da porção pélvica do seio urogenital. A virilização e diferenciação dos ductos de Wolff dependem da produção de testosterona pelo testículo. Quanto aos órgãos genitais externos do macho, o tubérculo genital é ampliado e as dobras uretrais se fundem para formar a uretra peniana. A fusão das dobras uretrais aproxima os tubérculos genitais para formar o escroto (figura 4). Figura 4: Diferenciação do aparelho genital da fêmea e do macho. Adaptado de KOOPMAN, 1989. A diferenciação dos órgãos genitais da fêmea ocorre de forma passiva, já que a ausência de testículos e por isso da hormona inibidora dos ductos de Müller (HIM), assim como dos andrógenos virilizantes, favorece o desenvolvimento dos ductos de Müller, enquanto os de Wolff sofrem atrofia. A porção cefálica dos ductos de Müller dá origem aos ovidutos, que na sua terminação caudal se fundem com o útero. O contato dos ductos de Müller com o seio urogenital induz uma intensa proliferação celular que resulta na formação da área uterovaginal localizado entre o seio urogenital e os ductos de Müller. As células do prato uterovaginal proliferam e aumentam a distância entre as duas estruturas criando o espaço que formará a vagina quando o prato é canalizado e forma um lúmen. Em contraste com o que ocorre no macho, na fêmea a maior parte do seio urogenital se mantém exposta na superfície da abertura onde desembocam a vagina e a uretra. O tubérculo urogenital da fêmea tem um crescimento limitado e forma o clitóris. A sequência de passos da diferenciação sexual do aparelho genital é resumida na tabela 1. Tabela 1: Destino em desenvolvimento dos rudimentos sexuais dos fetos macho e fêmea dos mamíferos -/- Rudimento sexual Macho Fêmea Gônada Testículo Ovário Ductos de Müller (Paramesonéfricos) Vestígios Útero, parte da vagina, ovidutos Ductos de Wolff (Mesonéfricos) Ductos eferentes deferentes, epidídimo, vesículas seminais Vestígios Seio urogenital Uretra, próstata, glândulas bulbouretrais Parte da vagina, uretra, vestíbulo, glândulas vestibulares Tubérculo genital Pênis Clitóris Pregas vestibulares Escroto Lábios vulvares Fonte: HAFEZ, 2004. 1.6 DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL DO HIPOTÁLAMO Os processos de diferenciação sexual não se limitam apenas às células somáticas do organismo do feto, mas incluem também os centros nervosos superiores do cérebro. Assim, da mesma maneira que a gônada e os ductos sexuais se desenvolvem para o tipo feminino ou masculino, propôs-se que o cérebro pode ser "masculinizado" ou permanecer "Feminizado". A diferenciação do hipotálamo vai depender do ambiente esteroidal do neonato e ocorre na fase perinatal. Estes eventos serão de grande transcendência na vida reprodutiva do indivíduo. Tanto a fêmea como o macho nascem com a capacidade de secreção de gonadotropinas de acordo com um padrão cíclico; contudo, no macho, a exposição do hipotálamo à ação dos andrógenos testiculares durante os primeiros dias da vida extrauterina provoca a masculinização, com o qual o hipotálamo do macho é programado para que a secreção de gonadotropinas se realize a um ritmo relativamente constante por parte da hipófise (secreção tônica). Na fêmea, tanto a secreção tônica como a cíclica se conservam. No entanto, observou-se que a injeção de testosterona ou o transplante de testículo na rata fêmea durante os primeiros dias de vida, suprime a sua futura atividade estral (secreção cíclica). Por outro lado, se os ovários forem transplantados para o rato macho normal castrado na idade adulta, o animal não desenvolve qualquer atividade cíclica, mas se os machos transplantados forem castrados ao nascer, o ovário é capaz de efetuar mudanças cíclicas e ovulações. Isto foi demonstrado em roedores, mas não em animais domésticos ou na espécie humana. Portanto, o padrão de secreção de gonadotropinas, seja cíclico ou tônico, não depende da hipófise, mas do hipotálamo e sua correta diferenciação. 1.7 CONCLUSÕES A maioria dos conhecimentos no campo da biologia do desenvolvimento e, muito especificamente, dos processos de diferenciação sexual têm sido originados de estudos relacionados com desordens congênitas, que na sua maioria devem-se a defeitos de genes específicos. A análise detalhada destas desordens permitiu entender alguns mecanismos endócrinos, moleculares e genéticos envolvidos na diferenciação sexual. A identificação do gene sry como determinante do testículo foi uma contribuição crucial e abriu as portas à compreensão dos mecanismos moleculares e celulares relacionados com o desenvolvimento do testículo. Se este gene não estiver presente, é criado um programa genético alternativo para levar a cabo a diferenciação gonodal para o ovário. Finalmente, devemos ter presente que é necessária uma correlação entre mudanças morfológicas e expressão de genes durante o desenvolvimento para entender os mecanismos relacionados com a diferenciação. -/- Apoio -/- Realização -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ANDERSON, Robert et al. The onset of germ cell migration in the mouse embryo. Mechanisms of development, v. 91, n. 1-2, p. 61-68, 2000. AUSTIN, Colin Russell; SHORT, R. V. Reproduction in Mammals: Volume 1, Germ Cells and Fertilization. Londres: Cambridge University Press, 1972. BRONSON, Franklin H. Mammalian reproductive biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. BUEHR, Mia. The primordial germ cells of mammals: some current perspectives. Experimental cell research, v. 232, n. 2, p. 194-207, 1997. BYSKOV, Anne G. Differentiation of mammalian embryonic gonad. Physiological reviews, v. 66, n. 1, p. 71-117, 1986. CAPEL, Blanche et al. Migration of mesonephric cells into the mammalian gonad depends on Sry. Mechanisms of development, v. 84, n. 1-2, p. 127-131, 1999. CAPEL, Blanche. The battle of the sexes. Mechanisms of development, v. 92, n. 1, p. 89-103, 2000. DERIVAUX, Jules; BARNABÉ, Renato Campanarut. Reprodução dos animais domésticos. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1980. DOMENICE, Sorahia et al. Aspectos moleculares da determinação e diferenciação sexual. Arquivos Brasileiros de Endocrinologia & Metabologia, v. 46, n. 4, p. 433-443, 2002. DONAHOE, Patricia K. et al. Mullerian inhibiting substance activity in bovine fetal, newborn and prepubertal testes. Biology of reproduction, v. 16, n. 2, p. 238-243, 1977. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HANLEY, Neil A. et al. Steroidogenic factor 1 (SF-1) is essential for ovarian development and function. Molecular and cellular endocrinology, v. 163, n. 1-2, p. 27-32, 2000. HIORT, Olaf; PAUL-MARTIN, H. The molecular basis of male sexual differentiation. European journal of endocrinology, v. 142, n. 2, p. 101-110, 2000. HOLY, Lubos; MARTÍNEZ JÚSTIZ, G. Colab. Biología de la reproducción bovina. Havana: Revolucionária, 1975. JOSSO, Nathalie et al. The role of anti-Müllerian hormone in gonadal development. Molecular and cellular endocrinology, v. 145, n. 1-2, p. 3-7, 1998. JOST, Alfred et al. Studies on sex differentiation in mammals. In: Proceedings of the 1972 Laurentian Hormone Conference. Londres: Academic Press, 1973. p. 1-41. KNOBIL, Ernst. Knobil and Neill's physiology of reproduction. EUA: Gulf Professional Publishing, 2006. KOFMAN ALFARO, S.; MERCHANT LARIOS, H.; PEREZ PALACIOS, G. Diferenciacion sexual. I. Bases biologicas del dimorfismo sexual. Rev. invest. clín, p. 349-59, 1982. KOOPMAN, Peter. Sry and Sox9: mammalian testis-determining genes. Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences CMLS, v. 55, n. 6-7, p. 839-856, 1999. MCDONALD, L. E. Veterinary endocrinology. Lea & Febiger, Philadelphia, Pa, 1969. MEIZEL, S.; JOHNSON, M. H. Development in mammals. MH Johnson, Ed, v. 3, p. 1-64, 1978. MELLO, Maricilda Palandi de; ASSUMPÇÃO, Juliana de G.; HACKEL, Christine. Genes envolvidos na determinação e diferenciação do sexo. Arquivos Brasileiros de Endocrinologia & Metabologia, v. 49, n. 1, p. 14-25, 2005. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS MERCHANT-LARIOS, H. Ovarian differentiation. The Vertebrate Ovary, p. 47-81, 1978. MIES FILHO, Antonio. Reprodução dos animais. Porto Alegre: Sulina, 1987. NEF, Serge; PARADA, Luis F. Hormones in male sexual development. Genes & Development, v. 14, n. 24, p. 3075-3086, 2000. PARKER, Keith L.; SCHEDL, Andreas; SCHIMMER, Bernard P. Gene interactions in gonadal development. Annual review of physiology, v. 61, n. 1, p. 417-433, 1999. SWAIN, Amanda; LOVELL-BADGE, Robin. Mammalian sex determination: a molecular drama. Genes & development, v. 13, n. 7, p. 755-767, 1999. WILHELM, Dagmar; PALMER, Stephen; KOOPMAN, Peter. Sex determination and gonadal development in mammals. Physiological reviews, v. 87, n. 1, p. 1-28, 2007. WILSON, Jean D.; GRIFFIN, James E.; GEORGE, Fredrick W. Sexual differentiation: early hormone synthesis and action. Biology of reproduction, v. 22, n. 1, p. 9-17, 1980. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 07 de Maio de 2020. (shrink)

What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I argue that wisdom consists in knowledge of how to live well, and that this knowledge of how to live well is constituted by various further kinds of knowledge. One concern for this view is that knowledge is not needed for wisdom but rather some state short of knowledge, such as having rational or justified beliefs about various topics. Another concern is that the emphasis on knowing how (...) to live well fails to do justice to the ancient tradition of ‘theoretical wisdom’. I address both of these concerns in filling out the account. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

In the mid-seventeenth century a movement of self-styled experimental philosophers emerged in Britain. Originating in the discipline of natural philosophy amongst Fellows of the fledgling Royal Society of London, it soon spread to medicine and by the eighteenth century had impacted moral and political philosophy and even aesthetics. Early modern experimental philosophers gave epistemic priority to observation and experiment over theorising and speculation. They decried the use of hypotheses and system-building without recourse to experiment and, in some quarters, developed a (...) philosophy of experiment. The movement spread to the Netherlands and France in the early eighteenth century and later impacted Germany. Its important role in early modern philosophy was subsequently eclipsed by the widespread adoption of the Kantian historiography of modern philosophy, which emphasised the distinction between rationalism and empiricism and had no place for the historical phenomenon of early modern experimental philosophy. The re-emergence of interest in early modern experimental philosophy roughly coincided with the development of contemporary x-phi and there are some important similarities between the two. (shrink)

This work offers an analysis of all the legal and moral issues surrounding humanitarian intervention: the deaths of innocent persons and the Doctrine of Double Effect Governmental legitimacy - The Doctrine of Effective Political Control; UN Charter and evaluation of the Nicaragua ruling; The Morality of not intervening; US-led invasion of Iraq; Humanitarian intervention authorised by the UN Security Council - Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia among others highlight NATO's intervention in Kosovo; The Nicaragua Decision; and The precedents of (...) Panama, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The book's features include: a new framework based on the doctrine of double effect; basic principles of international ethics; outline of the moral argument for humanitarian intervention; explores the morality and legality of military action to end tyranny or anarchy; arguments in a much more detailed and complete fashion than in previous editions; in-depth examination of philosophy of international law; the relationship between custom and moral theory; new discussion of the question of right authority; and a full analysis of recent interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. book addresses a broad interdisciplinary audience of international lawyers, philosophers, and political scientists. In this new edition, the author responds to critics while updating the discussion in the light of the momentous events that took place at the beginning of the new millennium. (shrink)

The following is a transcript of the interview I (Yasuko Kitano) conducted with Neil Levy (The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, CAPPE) on the 23rd in July 2009, while he was in Tokyo to give a series of lectures on neuroethics at The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy. I edited his words for publication with his approval.

Standpoint theorists have long been clear that marginalization does not make better understanding a given. They have been less clear, though, that social dominance does not make ignorance a given. Indeed, many standpoint theorists have implicitly committed themselves to what I call the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis. According to this thesis, there are strong, substantive limits on what the socially dominant can know about oppression that they do not personally experience. I argue that this thesis is not just implausible but (...) politically pernicious; it is an excuse for ignorance and silence that stifles our ability to address many injustices. Moreover, I argue that if we are to avoid lending support to the SEDT while working within a standpoint theory framework, we must hold that the socially dominant can achieve marginalized standpoints. So, we must hold that men can achieve feminist standpoints, that white women (and men) can achieve black feminist standpoints, and so on. (shrink)

Currently, there are many advocacy interventions aimed at reducing animal consumption. We report results from a lab (N = 267) and a field experiment (N = 208) exploring whether, and to what extent, some of those educational interventions are effective at shifting attitudes and behavior related to animal consumption. In the lab experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read a philosophical ethics paper, watch an animal advocacy video, read an advocacy pamphlet, or watch a control video. In the field experiment, (...) we measured the impact of college classes with animal ethics content versus college classes without animal ethics content. Using a pretest, post-test matched control group design, humane educational interventions generally made people more knowledgeable about animals used as food and reduced justifications and speciesist attitudes supporting animal consumption. None of the interventions in either experiment had a direct, measurable impact on self-reported animal consumption. These results suggest that while some educational interventions can change beliefs and attitudes about animal consumption, those same interventions have small impacts on animal consumption. (shrink)

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

Vaccination can protect vaccinated individuals and often also prevent them from spreading disease to other people. This opens up the possibility of getting vaccinated for the sake of others. In fact, altruistic vaccination has recently been conceptualized as a kind of vaccination that is undertaken primary for the benefit of others. In order to better understand the potential role of altruistic motives in people’s vaccination decisions, we conducted two focus group studies with a total of 37 participants. Study 1 included (...) three focus groups on the subject of HPV vaccination for boys. Study 2 included three focus groups on the subject of pertussis and measles vaccination for childcare workers. We found substantial evidence of other-regarding motives across all focus groups, which suggests that altruistic motives could be an important factor when it comes to people’s vaccination decisions. We address the significance of these findings for vaccination policy surrounding HPV vaccination for boys and vaccination for childcare workers. We also extend the findings to normative work on vaccination for the sake of others more generally. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Justification has long been considered a necessary condition for knowledge, and theories that deny the necessity of justification have been dismissed as nonstarters. In this chapter, we challenge this long-standing view by showing that many of the arguments offered in support of it fall short and by providing empirical evidence that individuals are often willing to attribute knowledge when epistemic justification is lacking.

After reviewing Kant’s well-known criticisms of the traditional proofs of God’s existence and his preferred moral argument, this paper presents a detailedanalysis of a densely-packed theistic argument in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Humanity’s ultimate moral destiny can be fulfilled only through organized religion, for only by participating in a religious community (or “church”) can we overcome the evil in human nature. Yet we cannot conceive how such a community can even be founded without presupposing God’s existence. Viewing (...) God as the internal moral lawgiver, empowering a community of believers, is Kant’s ultimate rationale for theistic belief. (shrink)

A number of concerns have been raised about the possible future use of pharmaceuticals designed to enhance cognitive, affective, and motivational processes, particularly where the aim is to produce morally better decisions or behavior. In this article, we draw attention to what is arguably a more worrying possibility: that pharmaceuticals currently in widespread therapeutic use are already having unintended effects on these processes, and thus on moral decision making and morally significant behavior. We review current evidence on the moral effects (...) of three widely used drugs or drug types: propranolol, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and drugs that effect oxytocin physiology. This evidence suggests that the alterations to moral decision making and behavior caused by these agents may have important and difficult-to-evaluate consequences, at least at the population level. We argue that the moral effects of these and other widely used pharmaceuticals warrant further empirical research and ethical analysis. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory. The essay addresses the classic (...) objection that the Humean theory cannot explain the feeling of obligation, Stephen Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. (shrink)

The psychology of reasoning uses norms to categorize responses to reasoning tasks as correct or incorrect in order to interpret the responses and compare them across reasoning tasks. This raises the arbitration problem: any number of norms can be used to evaluate the responses to any reasoning task and there doesn’t seem to be a principled way to arbitrate among them. Elqayam and Evans have argued that this problem is insoluble, so they call for the psychology of reasoning to dispense (...) with norms entirely. Alternatively, Stupple and Ball have argued that norms must be used, but the arbitration problem should be solved by favouring norms that are sensitive to the context, constraints, and goals of human reasoning. In this paper, I argue that the design of reasoning tasks requires the selection of norms that are indifferent to the factors that influence human responses to the tasks—which aren’t knowable during the task design phase, before the task has been given to human subjects. Moreover, I argue that the arbitration problem is easily dissolved: any well-designed task will contain instructions that implicitly or explicitly specify a single determinate norm, which specifies what would count as a solution to the task—independently of the context, constraints, and goals of human reasoning. Finally, I argue that discouraging the use of these a priori task norms may impair the design of novel reasoning tasks. (shrink)

The alleged conflict between religion and science most pointedly focuses on what it is to be human. Western philosophical thought regarding this has progressed through three broad stages: mind/body dualism, Neo-Darwinism, and most recently strong artificial intelligence (AI). I trace these views with respect to their relation to Christian views of humans, suggesting that while the first two might be compatible with Christian thought, strong AI presents serious challenges to a Christian understanding of personhood, including our freedom to choose, moral (...) choice itself, self-consciousness, and the relevance of God to our beginning, being, and ending. (shrink)

This paper is a concise survey of recent expressivist theories of discourse, focusing on the ethical case. For each topic discussed recent trends are summarised and suggestions for further reading provided. Issues covered include: the nature of the moral attitude; ‘hybrid’ views according to which moral judgements express both beliefs and attitudes; the quasi-realist programmes of Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard; the problem of creeping minimalism; the nature of the ‘expression’ relation; the Frege-Geach problem; the problem of wishful thinking; the (...) role of moral intuitions; expressivism in aesthetics. (shrink)

Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, (...) it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

The study’s goal was to provide an educational intervention in Algebra through GeoGebra that would boost students’ confidence, improve their learning, and correct their most minor mastered skills, allowing them to improve their Algebra performance. The research design was quasi-experimental, with 40 nonrandomly chosen participants comprising the GeoGebra and control groups. Mean and standard deviation was employed to describe the algebra performance and confidence of the respondents. At the same time, independent and dependent t-tests were used to determine the students’ (...) significant difference in algebra performance and confidence in the pre-and post-test between the control and GeoGebra groups. GeoGebra effectively improved algebra confidence, enhanced learning, and remedied the students’ least mastered skills. GeoGebra is recommended as an instructional material in teaching and learning Algebra and can be extended to other mathematics content areas. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as one of the founding fathers of modern liberal democracy. His political theory reaches its climax in the ground-breaking work, Perpetual Peace (1795), which sets out the basic framework for a world federation of states united by a system of international law. What is less well known is that two years earlier, in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/1794), Kant had postulated a very different, explicitly religious path to the politics of peace: he (...) presents the idea of an “ethical community” as a necessary requirement for humanity to become “satisfactory to God”. While many recent scholars have noted the importance of Kant’s concept of the ethical community, few recognize the force of his argument that such a community is possible only if it takes the form of a church; as a result, the precise status of his proposal remains unclear and under-appreciated. He argues in Division One, Section IV, of Religion’s Third Piece that the idea of this community can become a reality only through a “church” that is characterized by four rational requirements: unity, integrity, freedom, and the changeability of all church rules except these four unchangeable marks. Prior to Section IV, Division One portrays this ethical community as having a political form, yet an essentially nonpolitical matter. He compares it with Jewish theocracy, but observes that the latter failed to be an ethical commonwealth because it was explicitly political. Whereas traditional theocracy replaces the political state of nature (which conforms to the law, “might makes right”) with an ethical state of nature (which conforms to the law that I call, “should makes good”), or attempts to synthesize them, non-coercive theocracy transcends this distinction through a new perspective: it unites humanity in a common vision of a divine legislator whose only law is inward, binding church members together like families, through the law of love. Whereas the legal rights supported by democracy and a system of international law can go a long way to prepare for world peace, Kant’s conviction is that it will be ultimately impossible without support from healthy religion. (shrink)

Locates, discusses, and explains the transition between Nietzsche's middle and late periods represented by the first four books of _The Gay Science_.

This paper explores connections between theories of morality and theories of properties. It argues that (1) moral realism is in tension with predicate, class and mereological nominalism; (2) moral non-naturalism is incompatible with standard versions of resemblance nominalism, immanent realism and trope theory; and (3) the standard semantic arguments for property realism do not support moral realism. I also raise doubts about trope-theoretic explanations of moral supervenience and argue against one version of the principle that we should accept theories that (...) maintain neutrality. (shrink)

Although Kant had a high regard for Jesus as a moral teacher, interpreters typically assume that his philosophy disallows belief in Jesus as God. Those who regard Kant as a moral reductionist are especially likely to offer a negative construal of the densely-argued subsection of his 1793 Religion that relates directly to this issue. The recent “affirmative” trend in Kant-scholarship provides the basis for an alternative reading. First, theologians must regard Jesus as human so that belief in Jesus can empower (...) believers to become good. Second, theologians may refer to Jesus as divine by identifying his disposition as exemplifying the “archetype of perfect humanity.” Third, Judeo-Christian history poses an empirical problem that theologians can solve by interpreting Jesus’s divinity according to the schematism of analogy. While this does not constitute a robust (identifiably Christian) doctrine of Jesus’s divinity, it does provide clear guidelines for formulating such a tenet of historical faith. (shrink)

Several prominent contemporary philosophers, including Jürgen Habermas, John Caputo, and Robert Bernasconi, have at times painted a somewhat negative picture of Gadamer as not only an uncritical traditionalist, but also as one whose philosophical project fails to appreciate difference. Against such claims, I argue that Gadamer’s reflections on art exhibit a genuine appreciation for alterity not unrelated to his hermeneutical approach to the other. Thus, by bringing Gadamer’s reflections on our experience of art into conversation with key aspects of his (...) philosophical hermeneutics, we are able to better assess the viability of Gadamer’s contributions to contemporary discussions of difference and alterity. -/- Sections two through six focus on key concepts in Gadamer’s account of art’s dynamic ontology and our experience of art. Such concepts include the play structure of art, hermeneutic identity, tarrying with a work, and contemporaneity. The opening sections provide not only a discussion of these central themes, but they also (1) draw attention to the various ways in which difference and otherness are integral to Gadamer’s account, and (2) utilize relevant musical examples that prepare the reader for a more focused discussion of a Gadamerian approach to free jazz in section seven. By highlighting how Gadamer’s understanding of art possesses a dialogical play structure, is characterized by identity and difference, requires actively engaged spectators and auditors, and is amenable to what many criticize as an unintelligible musical expression, viz. free jazz, Gadamer’s project is shown as other-affirming and open to ambiguity and dynamism. That is, the essential structures and concepts characterizing Gadamer’s reflections on art are likewise central to his overall hermeneutical project, and hence are not rightly described as un-attuned to difference or other-negating. Rather, Gadamer’s philosophical project upholds difference, since it requires a dialogical interplay between self and other that creates the possibility for a transformative experience. (shrink)

According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences :635–642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein’s argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays . In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow :635–642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow’s argument (...) fails to show that special relativity does not pose a threat to metaphysical tensism. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of religion has often been portrayed as leaving no room for grace. Even recent interpreters seeking to affirm Kantian religion find his appeal to grace unconvincing, because they assume the relevant section of Religion (Second Piece, Section One, Subsection C) is an attempt to construct a theology of divine assistance. Yet Kant’s goal in attempting to solve the three "difficulties" with belief in grace is to defend an ethics of grace – i.e., an account of how someone can (...) believe in grace without succumbing to the tendency to become morally lazy. After introducing the three difficulties and offering a perspectival interpretation of how Kant intends to solve each one, this paper interprets Kant’s phenomenon-noumenon distinction in a way that clarifies how his solutions to these difficulties all focus on the believer’s ethical state, not on transcendent theological constructions. (shrink)

Recent work in neuroimaging suggests that some patients diagnosed as being in the persistent vegetative state are actually conscious. In this paper, we critically examine this new evidence. We argue that though it remains open to alternative interpretations, it strongly suggests the presence of consciousness in some patients. However, we argue that its ethical significance is less than many people seem to think. There are several different kinds of consciousness, and though all kinds of consciousness have some ethical significance, different (...) kinds underwrite different kinds of moral value. Demonstrating that patients have phenomenal consciousness — conscious states with some kind of qualitative feel to them — shows that they are moral patients, whose welfare must be taken into consideration. But only if they are subjects of a sophisticated kind of access consciousness — where access consciousness entails global availability of information to cognitive systems — are they persons, in the technical sense of the word employed by philosophers. In this sense, being a person is having the full moral status of ordinary human beings. We call for further research which might settle whether patients who manifest signs of consciousness possess the sophisticated kind of access consciousness required for personhood. (shrink)

This paper argues that qualia share their physical correlates' locations. The first premise comes from the theory of relativity: If something shares a time with a physical event in all reference frames, it shares that physical event’s location. The second premise is that qualia share times with their correlates in all reference frames. Having qualia and correlates share locations makes relations between them easier to explain, improving both physicalist and dualist theories.

Providing heroin to heroin addicts taking part in medical trials to assess the effectiveness of the drug as a treatment alternative, breaches ethical research standards, some ethicists maintain. Heroin addicts, they say, are unable to consent voluntarily to take part in these trials. Other ethicists disagree. In our view, both sides of the debate have an inadequate understanding of voluntariness. In this article we therefore offer a fuller conception, one which allows for a more flexible, case-to-case approach in which some (...) heroin addicts are considered capable of consenting voluntarily, others not. An advantage of this approach, it is argued, is that it provides a safety net to minimize the risk of inflicting harm on trial participants. (shrink)

This chapter considers the nature of imagination and belief, exploring how deeply these two states of mind differ. It first addresses a range of cognitive and motivational differences between imagination and belief which suggest that they're fundamentally different states of mind. Then it addresses imaginative immersion, delusions, and the different norms we apply to the two mental states, which some theorists regard as providing support for a more unified picture of imagination and belief.

This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation, can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT can help us resurrect the (...) much-maligned fragility response to the problems of late pre-emption by understanding fragility in counterpart-theoretic terms. Some reasons to prefer this CCT approach to rivals are discussed. (shrink)

Some theorists believe that there is a plurality of values, and that in many circumstances these values are incommensurable, or at least incomparable. Others believe that all values are reducible to a single super-value, or that even if there is a plurality of irreducible values these values are commensurable. But I will argue that both sides have got it wrong. Values are neither commensurable nor incommensurable, at least not in the way most people think. We are free to believe in (...) incommensurability or not, depending on what particular conception of morality we want to embrace. Incommensurability is accordingly not a theory about value. It is a presupposition that provides a necessary background condition for a certain kind of value to exist. It is therefore not the kind of view that can be morally true or false. As a presupposition, it can only be accepted or rejected on grounds that do not presuppose that morality already exists. Incommensurability is, like the rejection of hard determinism, one of the presuppositions on which morality as we know it happens to be based. (shrink)

Heidegger’s ontological views, his observations about liberalism and fascism, and his evaluative commitments are three premises of an argument for fascism. The ontological premise is that integrated wholes and objects of a creator or user’s will are ontologically superior, as Being and Time suggests in discussing Being-a-whole, creating art, and using equipment. The social premise is that fascist societies are wholes integrated by dictatorial will, while liberal societies are looser aggregates of free individuals, as Heidegger describes in his 1930s seminars. (...) The evaluative premise, shared with the medieval tradition and expressed in his notebook remarks about war, is that ontological superiority makes things better. The conclusion that fascism is better than liberalism should be rejected along with the evaluative premise. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that causation is transitive and in this paper I aim to reconcile this widely-held assumption with apparent evidence to the contrary. I will discuss a familiar approach to certain well-known counterexamples, before introducing a more resistant sort of case of my own. I will then offer a novel solution, based on Yablo’s proportionality principle, that succeeds in even these more resistant cases. There is a catch, however. Either proportionality is a constraint on which causal claims are (...) true, and the solution works, or it is not and causation is not transitive after all. I will argue that the first horn has unacceptable consequences and should be rejected, but that the second horn is less costly than it might initially appear. (shrink)